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ABSTRACT: In this paper I will argue that the two main approaches to statistical mechanics, that of 
Boltzmann and Gibbs, constitute two substantially different theoretical apparatuses. Particularly, I de-
fend that this theoretical split must be philosophically understood as a separation of epistemic functions 
within this physical domain: while Boltzmannians are able to generate powerful explanations of thermal 
phenomena from molecular dynamics, Gibbsians can statistically predict observable values in a highly 
effective way. Therefore, statistical mechanics is a counterexample to Hempel’s (1958) symmetry the-
sis, where the predictive capacity of a theory is directly correlated with its explanatory potential and vice 
versa.
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RESUMEN: En este trabajo argumentaremos que los dos principales enfoques de la mecánica estadística, 
el boltzmanniano y el gibbsiano, constituyen dos aparatos teóricos sustancialmente diferentes. En particular, 
defenderemos que esta división teórica debe entenderse filosóficamente como una separación de funciones epis-
témicas dentro de este dominio físico: mientras que los boltzmanianos son capaces de generar poderosas expli-
caciones de los fenómenos térmicos a partir de la dinámica molecular, los gibbsianos pueden predecir estadís-
ticamente los valores observables de una manera altamente efectiva. Por tanto, la mecánica estadística es un 
contraejemplo de la tesis de simetría de Hempel (1958), según la cual la capacidad de predicción de una teoría 
está directamente correlacionada con su potencial explicativo y viceversa.
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1. Introduction
Statistical mechanics is, together with quantum mechanics and relativistic physics, one 
of the main disciplines of modern physics. It consists essentially in the study of the mac-
roscopic behavior of certain systems, such as a gas expanding in a container, from the be-
havior of its microscopic components. However, unlike the other physical disciplines, sta-
tistical mechanics not only does not possess a single canonical theoretical apparatus, but 
there is no consensus within the philosophical literature about its fundamental problems 
(Wallace, 2020). Both the basic concepts and the technical procedures embedded in this 
discipline depend constitutively on the particular research program or approach adopted, 
mainly those known as Boltzmannian and Gibbsian. The fundamental problem lies in the 
fact that the theoretical elements of both formalisms are not primarily developed to satisfy 
the same epistemic functions.
In this paper I will argue that this fundamental difference between Boltzmannian and 
Gibbsian statistical mechanics should be understood not only as two different types of 
physical theories, as recently advocated by Frigg and Werndl (2019), but properly as two 
theoretical apparatuses with different epistemic capabilities. On the one hand, the Boltz-
mannian program was historically conceived to give an explanation of certain thermal phe-
nomena, such as the second law of thermodynamics, from the movement of its molecular 
components (Uffink, 2007). Almost a century and a half later, Neo-Boltzmannians still 
aim to offer powerful explanations of certain macroscopic behavior from the dynamic evo-
lution of the configuration of its components (e.g. Lebowitz, 1993; Callender, 1999; Al-
bert, 2000). However, their ability to predict such behavior is extremely computational-
ly-expensive due to the complexity of the statistical calculations involved. On the other 
hand, the Gibbsian program, undoubtedly the hegemonic formalism within actual statisti-
cal mechanical practices, symbolizes a significant progress in terms of computational trac-
tability of the required statistical mechanical calculations, which is necessary to carry out 
effective predictions (Wallace, 2020). However, there is a consensus in the literature on 
the Gibbsian inability to explain. Thus, this ‘epistemic schism’ in the core of statistical me-
chanics would be a clear counterexample to Hempel’s (1958) symmetry thesis, where the 
explanatory capacity of a theoretical apparatus is directly correlated to its predictive capac-
ity, and vice versa.
The plan for this paper is the following. First, I will explore the basis of statistical me-
chanics, pointing out the main differences between Boltzmann’s and Gibbs’ approaches. In 
Section 3, I will detail the conception of the equilibrium state of each of these formalisms, 
as well as their descriptions of the equilibrium approach as a properly thermal behavior. 
Next, I will argue that these differences between Boltzmannians and Gibbsians should be 
understood not only as a fundamental separation in their theoretical apparatuses, but as a 
schism in the fundamental epistemic capabilities of statistical mechanics. On the one hand, 
I will try to show (Section 5) the potential of Boltzmann’s statistical mechanics to gener-
ate powerful explanations of thermal behavior, on the other hand, I will analyze (Section 6) 
the capacity of Gibbs’ statistical mechanics to derive effective predictions of these phenom-
ena. Finally, I argue that this epistemic cleavage of statistical mechanics constitutes a clear 
counterexample to Hempel’s symmetry thesis.
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2. Framing Statistical Mechanics
Statistical mechanics (SM) is the branch of modern physics1 that studies the macroscopic 
behavior of certain systems from the dynamics of the microscopic components of these sys-
tems. For this, SM descriptions are usually made from the space of possible molecular var-
iables associated to the system, or simply ‘phase space’ Γ, which is a 6n-dimensional space 
(wherein n is the number of components of the system) that encodes all the possible dy-
namic values of position and momentum of the components of the system. For example, if 
the system described is a real gas in a closed container, then the phase space associated with 
the system will be of the order of 1024 dimensions.
2.1. Basic Elements of Statistical Mechanical Descriptions
In this statistical mechanical context, the unit of basic mechanical description (inherited 
from classical mechanics) is usually the ‘microstate’ of the system, in which all the position 
and moment values of all its components are determined at a given moment. Each individ-
ual microstate of the system is represented by a single point in the phase space Γ, determin-
ing all the microdynamic properties of the system at a time. However, effectively calculat-
ing this amount of microstatistical2 data is practically impossible with actual computational 
means (not to mention those that Boltzmann or Gibbs themselves had), for this reason the 
actual microstate of the system represented is usually considered as ‘epistemically inacces-
sible’ for the agent: “if these microstates were epistemically accessible, then probabilities 
would simply not have to be introduced in the theory and we would be able to use classical 
mechanics to describe such a system” (McCoy, 2020, p. 5).
If the dynamic evolution of the constituent elements of the system can be completely 
determined by the equations of motion of classical Newtonian or Hamiltonian mechanics 
(let us suppose that this is the case), then the evolution of the actual microstate of the sys-
tem will be determined in turn by a particular equation of motion or evolution function.3 
The dynamic evolution function of the microstate of the system, classically deterministic 
and time-invariant (that is, the same solution is compatible forward in time as it was back-
ward), specifies the exact trajectory that the representative phase point will travel along 
the dynamically accessible phase space of the system. Again, it is pragmatically impossible 
to calculate this evolutionary function for systems with a physically significant number of 
components.
On the other hand, the basic thermodynamic description unit (itself inherited from 
phenomenological thermodynamics) in the SM domain is the ‘macrovariable’ or observa-
tional variable of the system, such as pressure or volume in the example of a gas in a vessel. 
Note that some macrovariables in thermodynamics are directly observable and others indi-
rectly observable, such as Kelvin temperature and Clausius entropy, respectively. The pre-
1 Due to extension reasons, in this paper I will focus exclusively on classical statistical mechanics, and 
not on its quantum counterpart. 
2 Although it might be a bit cumbersome, the term ‘microstatistical’ can be used as a shortcut for expres-
sions like ‘based on (or ‘related to’) microstates of the system’.
3 This equation of motion is the famous Boltzmann equation, which specifies deterministically the evo-
lution of all components of a kinetic or molecular system (Uffink 2007).
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fix ‘macro-’ does not directly appeal to the fact that the property is macroscopic (although 
it usually is), but that it is a property whose value can be observationally determined. Each 
of the macrovariables fi that observationally describe the system y are represented in statisti-
cal mechanics approach by certain functions that associate a real number to each individual 
microstate of the system.
However, SM would be an incomplete theory just considering those elements, since 
it would not be possible to describe (much less explain or predict) the macroscopic be-
havior of systems based on the dynamics of their components. For this purpose, it would 
be necessary to specify a theoretical mechanism that would allow connecting the mac-
rovariables of the system with their possible microvariables (i) skipping the substantial 
pragmatic inconveniences derived from the impossible access to the individual micro-
states and their deterministic evolution, and (ii) making the microstatistical time-revers-
ibility derived from classical mechanics compatible with the time-irreversibility mani-
fested by the empirical laws of thermodynamics governing the macrovariables. However, 
this theoretical mechanism will be significantly different depending on the particular 
approach considered, whether it is the Boltzmannian or the Gibbsian one (Wallace, 
2020, pp. 586-588). This is mainly because, on the one hand, the probabilistic assump-
tions required to solve computationally the pragmatic intractability of the microstates4 
in (i) will be completely different. On the other hand, the fit of the observationally sig-
nificant description level of thermodynamics with the deterministic description level of 
classical mechanics in (ii) will not be common either, except for certain shared assump-
tions about the initial conditions5 (Albert, 2000). Let us see in detail what these differ-
ences consist of.
2.2.  Core Theoretical Elements in Boltzmann and Gibbs Statistical 
Mechanics
On the one hand, Boltzmannian statistical mechanics (BSM) introduces, between the 
microstatistical and the macrovariable levels, a third level of description6 based on the no-
tion of ‘macrostate’ (Lavis, 2005). On the part that connects it with the thermodynamic 
description level, a particular macrostate Γm of the system would be defined from the spe-
cific values of a set of macrovariables fi that describe the system observationally. On the 
part that connects it with the level of mechanical description, an individual macrostate x of 
the system is determined by a continuous set of many microstates, and therefore would be 
directly linked to a particular region of phase space. In this sense, a set of macrostates Γmi of 
a system would constitute in turn a partition of phase space Γ into topologically disjointed 
regions. Therefore, according to BSM the system would be mechanically described by a sin-
gle macrostate Γm at each time t, connected both (a) to the phase region Γm in which the 
4 Here lies a conception of statistical mechanical probabilities as ‘shortcuts’ to effectively compute an 
overwhelming amount of microscopic data (Shenker, 2020).
5 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for mentioning this point.
6 Lavis (2005) established three levels of statistical mechanical description, which I will use in my anal-
ysis, namely (1) the microstatistical or dynamic level, (2) the macrostatistical or statistical level, and 
(3) the thermodynamic level.
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actual microstate x of the system would be found within a continuous set of macroscop-
ically indistinguishable microstates, and (b) with the particular real-value of each of the 
macrovariables f i that observationally describe the system, thus connecting both levels of 
description.
It should be noted that the historical introduction of macrostatistical descriptions of 
physical systems by Boltzmann in his celebrated 1877 combinatorial argument responds 
precisely to the above problem of the practical impossibility of completing the microstate 
of the system (Uffink, 2007). Within the Botzmannian literature (Lebowitz, 1993; Albert, 
2000; Goldstein et  al., 2020), the introduction of macrostates (or also coarse-graining) 
by means of partitioning phase space Γ is usually justified on the basis of the instrumen-
tal limits of the observational capacity of scientific agents. In this sense, each of the possi-
ble microstates that make up a particular macrostate Γm would be observationally indis-
tinguishable from any other distinct microstate within that same phase region associated 
with the macrostate. Here, it should be introduced the probabilistic assumption of BSM 
wherein all the microstates contained in Γm are equiprobable.
On the other hand, Gibbsian statistical mechanics (GSM) is theoretically based not 
on the statistical mechanical description of an individual physical system, such as a gas in 
a vessel, but on a continuous set of virtual copies of the same system subject to constant 
macroscopic values but with different microscopic values, which is usually called ‘ensem-
ble’. Depending on the macrovariables used as observational constrains, the ensemble used 
to describe the phenomenon will be (mainly) microcanonical, canonical or grand canoni-
cal. Those ensembles are represented by a probability distribution function r defined over 
the phase space Γ associated with the system, by which the probability of occurrence of the 
actual microstate x of the system within the phase region r. In this sense, the values of the 
macrovariables A characterizing the system at each moment would be obtained by phase 
averaging 〈A〉Γ all macro-values derived from the probability distribution r, thus theoreti-
cally connecting the level of observational-thermal dynamic description of the system with 
its level of microstatistical mechanical description.
3. Boltzmannian and Gibbsian Accounting for the Approach to Equilibrium
On the one hand, for BSM the thermal equilibrium state of a system would be properly 
represented mechanically by a particular macrostate Γm of this system (Lazarovici, 2019). 
In particular, one of the most extended assumptions within the Boltzmannian approach 
(defended by Boltzmann [1896] himself) is that this equilibrium macrostate Γmeq is pre-
cisely the one with the largest phase volume, where this volume is usually measured by 
means of Lebesgue’s measure,7 which is justified by the fact that this measure will be con-
served during the dynamic evolution of the system according to Liouville’s theorem.8 It 
7 As Shenker (2020) points out, the constant use of the Lebesgue measure μ within the literature is usu-
ally justified because it is conserved during the evolution of the system according to the Liouville theo-
rem (see note 7).
8 Liouville’s theorem states that the μ-measured phase volume of a set of microstates of a system will 
conserved during its dynamic (and Hamiltonian) evolution.
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should be noted that the famous Boltzmann entropy SB of an individual macroscopic sys-
tem encoded in an individual microstate is defined by the natural logarithm of the measure 
of the number (or properly ‘volume’) of microstates contained within the macrostate-re-
gion ΓM in which the actual microstate x is located at that time.
(1)   SB(Γm) = k In μ(Γm)
In the context of BSM, the entropy of a physical system will depend directly on the phase 
volume of the macro-state in which it is located. Therefore, if the actual microstate x of the 
system is found within the set of observationally indistinguishable microstates (and with 
the same probability of occurrence) contained in macrostate Γm, the value of its Boltzmann 
entropy will increase if that microstate x dynamically transits towards a macrostate-region 
Γm2 whose phase volume is greater than Γm and will decrease if it transits towards a macro-
state-region Γm1 whose phase volume is lesser than Γm. Thus, an individual system will be 
BSM-represented as being in its thermal state if its actual microstate x lies within the mac-
rostate-region Γmeq of largest volume (in fact, Γmeq occupies almost the entire Γ), associated 
with the macroscopic values of the thermal state.
As is well known, one of the main disadvantages of the Boltzmannian representation 
of the thermal equilibrium state is that, as derived from the Loschmidt irreversibility para-
dox and the Poincaré recurrence theorem, there is a theoretical possibility (although ridic-
ulously improbable) that, once the representative microstate is within the region associated 
with the thermal equilibrium, it may transit towards regions of smaller volume and there-
fore abandon the equilibrium state.9 This, of course, directly contradicts certain empiri-
cal principles of thermodynamics, by which (i) every system must progressively approach 
its state of equilibrium if it is not already in fact in this state (i.e. law of approximation to 
equilibrium, see Shenker and Hemmo, 2012) and (ii) the entropy of a system can never de-
crease (i.e. second law of thermodynamics). However, the demonstration at the beginning 
of the 20th century of the existence of spontaneous thermal fluctuations at the molecular 
level (where the second law is constantly violated) caused these principles of thermody-
namics to be replaced by empirical regularities whose validity was not deterministic but sta-
tistical (see Sklar, 1993).
On the other hand, for GSM the thermal equilibrium state of an ensemble is repre-
sented statistically by what Gibbs himself called ‘statistical equilibrium’ and defined as fol-
lows: the probability distribution r that represents the ensemble is in statistical equilibrium 
if and only if it is stationary. Additionally, the phase volume of r will be conserved during 
the dynamic evolution of the system according to Liouville’s theorem of classical mechan-
ics. Note that through this Gibbsian formulation of the thermal equilibrium state, the av-
erage phase values 〈A〉Γ of the macrovariables (pressure, temperature, volumen and so on) 
that observationally describe the ensemble remain invariant once the probability distribu-
tion r reaches statistical-ensemble equilibrium. In the same way that Boltzmann (1896) 
aimed to reformulated Clausius thermodynamic entropy by means of mechanical concepts 
9 While the irreversibility paradox states that the reversibility of the system components would allow 
the systems to have anti-thermal behaviors (e.g., decreasing their entropy), the recurrence theorem 
states that the actual microstate of the system will return to that same point in phase space in an ex-
tremely long period of time (Goldstein, 2020).
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(i.e. molecular position-velocities) and statistical assumptions, the Gibbs fine-grained en-
tropy SGf (2) of an ensemble (or just ‘ensemble entropy’) was straightforwardly defined 
from the integral of the probability distribution defined over phase space:
(2)   SGf [ρ] = –k ∫Γ ρ log ρ
However, this implies according to the Liouville theorem of classical mechanics that the 
Gibbs fine-grained entropy SGf of the ρ-encoded ensemble remains constant during the 
evolution of the system, even when this evolution corresponds to an equilibration process.
Let’s suppose that we want to SM-represent a paradigmatic thermodynamic behav-
ior, such as the approximation of certain systems to their thermal equilibrium state or 
also known as ‘equilibrium process’. For example, let us imagine the paradigmatic case of 
a gas confined in half the volume V of a vessel, which, after retiring the partition inserted 
in the middle of the vessel, begins to expand spontaneously until it occupies its entire vol-
ume 2V.
On the one hand, the approximation of a system to its state of thermal equilibrium 
would be described in BSM, at least in its standard formulation, as follows. Fundamentally, 
the free expansion of a gas in a vessel would be represented by a phase path g originated in a 
macrostate Γm occupying a small region in Γ and directed towards larger phase regions un-
til eventually reaching the phase region associated with the equilibrium macrostate Γmeq at 
the moment when the gas reaches the entire volume of the vessel in which it expands (Fig-
ure 1, left). It is assumed that Γmeq occupies almost the entire phase space Γ of the gas-recipi-
ent system. Of course, once the phase trajectory g has reached the region associated with the 
equilibrium region Γmeq it will be able (with a negligible degree of probability) to transit re-
gions external to that macro-region at later moments of the dynamic evolution of the gas. 
According to the definition of Boltzmann entropy (1), its value would be modified during 
the expansion of the gas proportionally to the volume of the macrostate through which the 
actual microstate x dynamically transits across Γ, reaching its maximum value once it reaches 
the thermal equilibrium macrostate Γmeq at t, so that k log μ[Γm(t0)] < k log μ[Γmeq(t)], (see 
 Figure 1, left). It is precisely in the system’s equilibrium state (i.e. the gas occupies the en-
tire volume of the vessel) wherein the value of Boltzmann entropy will coincide numerically 
with Clausius thermodynamic entropy (see Callender, 1999).
Figure 1
Phase-space portraits of a physical system approaching thermal equilibrium according  
to BSM (Left) and GSM (Right)
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On the other hand, the fact that the Gibbs fine-grained entropy (2) of the probability dis-
tribution r remain constant during the entire expansion of the gas in a closed vessel some-
how go against thermodynamic predictions (i.e., the value of the thermodynamic entropy 
of the gas-recipient must increase during this same process), assuming that the former 
must somehow be consistent with the empirical results of the former.10 To this end, Gibbs 
(1902) himself introduced an algorithm to allow entropy to ‘change’ in the dynamic evo-
lution of the system, highly increasing the computational ease with which the values of the 
macrovariables could be calculated (Uffink, 2007). This algorithm was based on partition-
ing (also called coarse-graining procedure) the system’s phase space Γ into cells ωwi having 
the same phase volume.
Based on this partitioning, at a certain moment of the Liouville-driven dynamic evo-
lution of the distribution ρ over the phase space Γ of the gas, a phase average 〈A〉 of the 
macroscopic values encoded in the ensemble-represented probability distribution ρ will 
be performed, thus deriving a probability distribution ρ* whose main distinctive feature 
is its uniform distribution on Γ. Once defined this new probability distribution ρ*, it can 
be used to determine the values of a new measure of entropy, usually called Gibbs coarse-
grained entropy SGc (ρ*). In this new coarse-grained context, the theoretical criterion for 
defining the statistical equilibrium of the ensemble is no longer its stationarity but the de-
gree of uniformity with which its values are distributed. In this way, it is easy to see that 
SGf (ρ) ≤ SGc (ρ*) (see Figure 1, right), i.e., the value of coarse-grained entropy defined on 
ρ* will always be greater than or equal to (in the case where both ρ and ρ* are uniform) 
the fine-grained entropy defined on ρ. By means of this precise algorithmic procedure, we 
can efficiently compute from GSM the approach of the ρ-encoded ensemble to the coarse-
grained state of statistical-ensemble equilibrium (wherein phase averages quantities 〈A〉 re-
main invariant), in a manner consistent with or mimicking the increase in thermodynamic 
entropy of the gas until it reaches its maximum by occupying the entire volume of the ves-
sel (see Wallace, 2020).
4. The Foundational Schism between Boltzmann and Gibbs Statistical Mechanics
As it has been displayed in the previous sections, there is a significative split of the theo-
retical architecture of SM into BSM and GSM. Although in this section I will go deeper 
into such splitting, the reader should not forget the common theoretical ground (e.g. use 
of phase space) (Section 2.1) or the empirical success of both frameworks on the same do-
main of reality, which makes the splitting of this discipline even more surprising. My main 
thesis is that this deep theoretical split of SM can be supported, on the one hand, by the 
fact that (i) neither the central concepts of BSM are interchangeable with those of GSM or 
vice versa (Section 2.2), (ii) nor the individualist-based descriptions of thermophysical phe-
nomena from BSM can be completely translated into GSM-ensemblist terms (Section 3), 
independently of whether their numerical values coincide (as usually happens in equilib-
rium, see Lazarovici, 2019) or not.
10 For assessing the original discussion on the conceptual and quantitative connection between Gibbs en-
tropy and Clausius entropy via ‘thermodynamical analogues’, see Gibbs (1902).
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Illustratively, Boltzmann concept of thermal equilibrium cannot be interchanged with 
the Gibbsian concept of equilibrium simply because its way of representing (or its ‘inten-
sion’) this state is different, since the former defines from macrostate (reportable from 
GSM) and the latter by properties of a probability distribution ρ. Essentially, both con-
cepts are not theoretically equivalent or co-extensional precisely because the state-of-af-
fairs they refer to (or its ‘extension’) would be radically different in both cases: while Boltz-
mann equilibrium state refers to a thermal property of an individual physical system, the 
Gibbsian equilibrium state refers to a statistical property of a fictitious set of virtual copies 
(namely, the ensemble) of the target system (Goldstein et al., 2020).
On the other hand, the fact that the statistical mechanical concepts of BSM and GSM 
are not interchangeable consequently means that the descriptions of thermal phenomena 
which can be derived from both theoretical devices, as in the case of a gas expanding spon-
taneously through the volume of a vessel (see Section 3.2), cannot become interchangeable. 
One of the most illustrative cases of this theoretical untranslatability between BSM and 
GSM is what is known in the literature as ‘Sklar’s dilemma’ (Sklar, 1993; McCoy, 2020), 
which can be described for the case of the equilibrium approach of the systems as follows. 
While for the Gibbsian approximation, once the ensemble r reaches the statistical-ensem-
ble equilibrium state (by means of the coarse-graining procedure, as detailed above) it will 
remain there if there is no external intervention, according to thermodynamic predictions. 
For the Boltzmannian approximation, once the individual system gradually reaches the 
macrostate-region Γmeq of thermal equilibrium, it may eventually fluctuate outside that 
equilibrium macrostate, against the empirical regularities of thermodynamics.
However, the fact that the two main approaches to one of the central disciplines of 
modern physics are theoretically disconnected poses a huge problem for the foundational 
task of understanding the mutual co-existence of two SM-theories (not even two SM-for-
malisms or SM-interpretation) about the very same physical domain. This fundamental 
theoretical split of SM has recently been treated interpretively by Frigg and Werndl (2019) 
in such a way that BSM and GSM would constitute different types of statistical mechanical 
theories. Namely, the first as a fundamental theory and the second as an effective theory. 
This means that “BSM provides a true description of the system within the scope of SM; 
GSM offers an algorithm to calculate values defined by the fundamental theory” (Frigg and 
Werndl, 2019, p. 425). However, that the Boltzmannian approach can be conceived as a 
‘fundamental’ theory does not imply that the GSM theoretical apparatus can be derived en-
tirely from BSM, nor that the epistemic virtues of the latter can be inherited by the former. 
Claiming that BSM is a ‘fundamental’ theory just means that the macroscopic properties of 
the systems are assumed within this framework to ‘supervene’ (or ‘depend directly’) on the 
basic mechanical properties of the molecular system (e.g. Shenker, 2020).
On the other hand, the ensemblist and pro-GSM philosopher David Wallace (2020) 
proposes to interpret BSM not as a different domain à la Frigg-Werndl, but as a special 
case of GSM. However, as the author himself points out (Wallace, 2020, pp.  584-585), 
this does not imply that both should be characterized from the same theoretical resources, 
since it is evident that this is not the case, i.e. BSM: macrostates, individual systems, Boltz-
mann entropy (1), Boltzmann equilibrium, and GSM: phase averages, ensembles, Gibbs 
fine-grained (2) and coarse-grained entropy, and equilibrium ensembles. Although it is true 
that Gibbs entropy mathematically generalizes Boltzmann entropy for non-uniform prob-
ability distributions over microstates, the latter incorporates in its definition the notion of 
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system’s macrostate (set of observationally indistinguishable micro-states), which is mean-
ingless within standard GSM’s ensemble-based theoretical apparatus. Therefore, that ac-
cording to Wallace (2020) BSM should be regarded a special case of GSM regarding the ap-
plication domain can be fully compatible with both empirically successful SM-approaches 
using different concepts and generating different theoretical descriptions of the same phe-
nomenon (Figure 1). This theoretical-conceptual separation is well illustrated in this quo-
tation of Goldstein:
The Gibbs entropy [2] is an efficient tool for computing entropy values in thermal equilib-
rium when applied to the Gibbsian equilibrium ensembles ρ, but the fundamental definition of 
entropy is the Boltzmann entropy [1]. We have discussed the status of the two notions of entropy 
and of the corresponding two notions of thermal equilibrium, the “ensemblist” and the “individ-
ualist” view. Gibbs’s ensembles are very useful, in particular, as they allow the efficient computa-
tion of thermodynamic functions (…), but their role can only be understood in Boltzmann’s indi-
vidualist framework. (Goldstein et al., 2020, p. 576)
Following Goldstein here, I defend now that the statistical mechanical schism existing be-
tween BSM and GSM (as well as between ‘individualists’ and ‘ensemblists’, see Goldstein, 
2019) must be fundamentally understood as a split of the main epistemic functions (e.g. 
explanatory, predictive, etc.) of SM globally considered. In particular, I argue that BSM is 
a statistical mechanical theory capable not only of providing true descriptions but also of 
generating powerful explanations of certain phenomena; while GSM is a statistical me-
chanical theory capable of generating effective predictions about the evolution of the 
macrova riables of the observed system. In the following, I will focus, on the one hand, on 
defining how we should conceive this ‘explanatory power’ of BSM and ‘predictive effective-
ness’ of GSM; and, on the other hand, on explaining the main arguments why these two 
statistical mechanical devices should be theoretically qualified according to these epistemic 
capabilities.
5. The Explanatory Power of Boltzmann Statistical Mechanics
It is openly assumed within the scientific community that one of the main tasks of SM is 
to explain the macroscopic behavior of certain systems from the inaccessible dynamics of 
their components. In particular, this discipline must explain what phase changes are expe-
rienced by certain materials (i.e. why an ice melts into a hot cup), why certain properties of 
a fluid remain stable under certain conditions or why a gas tends to expand spontaneously 
throughout the volume of the container that contains it. In short, SM could be assumed as 
a fundamentally explanatory physical theory.
Although this explanatory character of SM is widely recognized, we do not find in the 
literature any systematic and explicit discussion on how we should philosophically under-
stand such kinds of explanations, at least until the recent publication of ’Statistical Me-
chanics and Scientific Explanation’ (Allori, 2020). It should be noted here that virtually all 
previous philosophical analyses of statistical mechanical explanations employed an every-
day notion of ‘explanation’, with exceptions like Myrvold (2016) or Wilhelm (2019), who 
seem to explicitly advocate a statistical and a deductive-nomological model of explanations, 
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respectively. For reasons of extension, in this paper I will follow this strategy.11 Specifically, 
to define the concept of ‘explanatory power’ I will not presuppose any of the main mod-
els of explanation (i.e., causal-mechanistic, unificationist, pluralist, etc.), although it may 
arguably be more compatible with one than with the other. Illustratively, Lazarovici and 
Reichert defended that the application of deductive-nomological model in this scenario 
(consisting of the logical-deductive derivation of macroscopic laws from microscopic laws 
and auxiliary assumptions) would be especially problematic precisely because this “misses 
the crucial role that initial conditions play in the explanation of a macroscopic phenome-
non” (Lazarovici and Reichert, 2015, p.704). In the vein of Lazarovici and Reichert (2015), 
the only minimalist requirement would only be that any statistical mechanical explana-
tion must at least appeal both to (i) the system’s initial conditions at t0 and (ii) a property P 
about the dynamical behavior of the system’s molecular constituents, since this is precisely 
the characteristic feature of such a physical discipline (see Section 2.1). Note that these two 
minimum requirements are prima facie compatible with both BSM and GSM, since it is 
only required that the explanation of the thermal-macroscopic behavior of a substance de-
scriptively depends on the dynamics of its molecular components (Section 2).
Interestingly, Myrvold (2016) recently developed an account on SM-explanations of 
the approach to equilibrium based in these two minimal requirements (i-ii): “A system 
behaves as it does because of its dynamics, together with initial conditions. Explanations 
of relaxation to equilibrium will have to involve an argument that the dynamics, together 
with initial conditions of the right type, yields that behavior.” (Myrvold, 2016, p. 33). In 
this quotation, Myrvold points out that it is precisely (i) a microstatistical-dynamic prop-
erty and (ii) certain particular initial conditions12 that would make up the explananda of 
the equilibrium approach of a gas as an explanandum. Thus, this plausible statistical me-
chanical explanation would also require explaining (or at least justifying consistently) why 
this particular dynamic is somehow theoretically and experimentally compatible with the 
initial conditions proposed to describe the values of the system at the beginning of this evo-
lution. Up to this point, a minimal explanatory power criterion can be defined as follows
Explanatory Power Criterion:
A statistical mechanical description D of the thermal behavior θ of a molecular system consti-
tutes a powerful explanation of θ if this description is abducted from (i) the system’s (either en-
semble ρ or macrostate-encoded M0) initial conditions and (ii) the microstatistical properties P of 
the system that generates during its evolution such thermal behavior θ.
As it can be noticed, the main virtue of this criterion is that it offers us a guarantee that 
the content of the explananda (i.e., a thermal behavior as the approximation to equilib-
rium) would be abductively derived according to the procedures of the respective statisti-
cal mechanical formalism of the content of the explanadum, being this (i) the initial con-
dition and (ii) a microstatistical property of the system that gives rise to that macroscopic 
11 I will leave for a future paper the task of analyzing the compatibility of statistical mechanical explana-
tions with the models of scientific explanation that we can find in the philosophical literature.
12 For instance, by assuming that the system would initially be properly represented by a uniform proba-
bility distribution à la Albert (2000).
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 behavior. I agree with Lazarovici and Reichert (2015, p. 704) in defending that a mere for-
mal-deductive derivation of the equilibrium from (ii) a particular dynamic property of the 
system would not constitute properly an ‘explanation’ of such a thermal phenomenon, 
since this would trivialize the importance of the initial/boundary conditions of the system. 
That is why this criterion is based on abductive reasoning, where the approach to equilib-
rium could be inferred (in an approximate, estimated and fallible way) from the behav-
ior of the system’s components and always according to the particular circumstances. An-
other advantage of this explanatory power criterion in SM that I defend is directly part of 
the pivotal consideration of statistical mechanics, wherein the thermal behavior of the sys-
tems to be explained depends intrinsically on the deterministic and reversible evolution of 
the system components (common assumption from both BSM and GSM, see Section 2). 
Finally, in this criterion I postulate at least a minimal necessary condition for a description 
to constitute a powerful explanation; this would allow to be philosophically complemented 
by additional necessary conditions, although it is highly debatable what these should be.
On the one hand, one can show how any standard description of the paradigmatic ther-
mal behavior of the GSM-derived equilibrium approach (Section 3.2) would not meet the 
explanatory power criterion: i.e., “the ensemble interpretation of statistical mechanics makes 
it unclear how statistical mechanics can explain the behavior of individual systems” ( McCoy, 
2020). The main reason is twofold. Firstly, the Gibbsian descriptions of thermal-macro-
scopic behavior (see Section 3) do not specify any microstatistical properties from which 
can be abductively derived the values of the macrovariables fi encoded in the coarse-grained 
probabilities13 ρ*, they simply specify the theoretical procedures required to adjust (via 
phase-averaging and coarse-graining) these values according to phenomenological thermo-
dynamics. Thus, standard GSM-descriptions fail to satisfy condition (ii) of the above mini-
mum criteria. Second, these same Gibbsian descriptions depend constitutively on eliminat-
ing the microstatistical details pertaining to the initial system condition (encoded in ρ) by 
introducing a new probability distribution ρ*. Therefore, they would also fail to satisfy con-
dition (i). Therefore, this criterion would shed light on why GSM descriptions not only do 
not constitute powerful explanations, but have no explanatory capacity regarding equilibra-
tion, a fact agreed in the SM community as noted above. In Wallace’s words: “As such, de-
spite the acknowledged technical advantages of the Gibbsian approach, the Boltzmannian 
offers the true explanation of the success of statistical mechanics” ( Wallace, 2020, p. 584).
In fact, Wallace (2011, 2020) sought to exploit the explanatory potential of GSM 
to the fullest. On the one hand, his proposal satisfies condition (ii) by specifying the mi-
cro-dynamical properties of the system through what he calls ‘Simple Dynamical Conjec-
ture14’ (Wallace, 2011). On the other hand, Wallace’s proposal also initially satisfies (i) by 
specifying in density r the initial condition of the system at t0. However, his ‘Simple Dy-
13 Outside the Gibbsian context, some pro-BSM authors defend (even in an explanatory way) that the 
dynamics of the system must have some fancy mathematical properties such as ‘ergodicity’ or ‘mixing’, 
by which the microstates of a small phase region would eventually cover all the space of a larger phase 
region (see Sklar, 1999).
14 “Simple Dynamical Conjecture (for a given system with coarse-graining C): Any distribution whose 
structure is at all simple is forward predictable by C; any distribution not so predictable is highly com-
plicated and as such is not specifiable in any simple way except by stipulating that it is generated via 
evolving some other distribution in time” (Wallace, 2011).
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namical Conjecture’ necessarily requires introducing at t1 a coarse-graining C: ρ → ρ* of 
the initial density r to a new density ρ* with certain properties (like forward-compatibility, 
see Robertson, 2020). Thus, Wallace’s (2011, 2020) Gibbsian explanation of the approach 
to equilibrium ceases to satisfy (i) when coarse-graining at is introduced at t1, due to the 
fact that the required initial conditions (i) are no longer specified in ρ*. Therefore, it does 
not satisfy the explanatory power criterion.
On the other hand, one can argue that certain BSM descriptions of thermal behavior 
can meet the above explanatory power criterion. In fact, Boltzmann himself (1896) was 
one of the pioneers in providing a statistical mechanical explanation of this thermal phe-
nomenon. According to his canonical proposal (Callender 1993), the approach to equi-
librium could be powerfully explained from (i) the fact that every possible microstate x 
contained in low-entropy macrostate Γm transits ‘typically’ (i.e., except in an insignificant 
number of cases, see, Lebowitz, 1993) towards the equilibrium macrostate Γmeq, and from 
(ii) the fact that the system is actually within a low-entropy macrostate Γm (Figure 1, left). 
In terms of Goldstein et al. (2020) “a feature or behavior is said to be typical in a set S if it 
occurs for most (i.e., for the overwhelming majority of) elements of S” (Goldstein et  al., 
2020, p. 559). This would constitute a powerful explanation according to the above crite-
rion. Boltzmann’s original explanatory strategy will be recovered from the 1990s onwards 
by Neo-Boltzmannian authors such as Lebowitz (1993) or Goldstein (et al., 2020) as the 
‘typicalist explanation’ of the approach to equilibrium based on the abductive exploitation 
of the vast majority of the phase volume from the initial macrostate15 μ(Γm) it would be 
within the equilibrium macrostate-region Γmeq after a certain time interval, except for an ex-
tremely tiny subvolume that would account for thermal fluctuations outside equilibrium.
The key here is that this distinctive type of typicalist reasoning (Wilhelm, 2019) al-
lows us to delimit with conceptual precision what is the plausible microstatistical or mo-
lecular-dynamic reason (or ‘hypothesis’, in abductive terms) that underlies macroscopic be-
haviors such as gas equilibration within a vessel. Recently, Wilhem (2019) argued from a 
Hempelian framework of explanations that typicalist reasoning is not necessarily probabil-
istic (or ‘inductive’). In this sense, I defend that the inferential behavior underlying typical-
ity-based explanatory reasoning would be nicely characterized as being an ‘abductive’ (not 
deductive nor inductive) process:
Initial Condition (i): The actual microstate x is in Γm at t0
Typicality Hypothesis (ii): Most microstates in Γm at t0 will be in Γmeq at t1
Abducted Explananda: It is plausible that the actual microstate x is in Γmeq at t1
Therefore, (ii) ‘typicality’ as a microstatistical property together with (i) certain ideal in-
itial conditions (like an initial low-entropy macrostate Γm or ‘Past Hypothesis’, Albert, 
2000) would allow us to powerfully explain within BSM the approach to the equilibrium 
of macroscopic systems from the behavior of their microscopic components (Lazarovici 
and Reichert, 2015, p.  704). Other pro-BSM authors postulate that statistical mechani-
15 The phase volume of each macrostate would be determined by means of the Lebesgue measure, which 
is conserved during the evolution of the system according to the Liouville principle. However, this is 
not the only measure of phase volume we could consider (see Shenker, 2020).
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cal explanations of equilibrium should not be based on typicality as a physically significant 
microstatistical property but on certain mathematical properties of dynamical systems, 
such as the explanation by Frigg and Werndl (2011) based on what is known as epsilon-er-
godicity. However, the physically significance of such formal-dynamic ergodic-like proper-
ties (namely, whether these properties can be applied to real molecular systems) is still con-
tentious within the philosophical literature.
In any case, the explanatory potential of the Boltzmannian theoretical apparatus rests 
directly on the descriptive exploitation of the microstatistical dynamics of ‘individual’ 
physical systems allows it under certain conditions to generate theoretically powerful expla-
nations of thermal behaviors such as the expansion of a gas in a vessel, making abductively 
explicit the microstatistical properties (i.e. typicality) that produce such behaviors. Then, 
BSM stands as a physical theory well-capable of generating powerful statistical mechanical 
explanations of certain thermal behaviors.
6. The Predictive Effectiveness of Gibbsian Statistical Mechanics
In contrast to the descriptive-explanatory virtues that I have just pointed out in detail in 
the previous section, Boltzmannian formalism has been enormously disregarded through-
out the history of statistical mechanical practices due to its expensive calculus-computa-
tional costs when using it in real scientific contexts. Among these practices, the prediction 
of observational values during the dynamic evolution of certain systems would be un-
doubtedly one of the central epistemic functions of SM. However, for BSM (although its 
many real applications) it would be difficult to efficiently compute such extremely complex 
(n ≈  1023) predictions. This would somehow explain the hegemony of GSM during the 
20th century: “Surely, the calculational ease of the Gibbs approach is the primary reason 
why it dominates other approaches” (Callender, 1999, pp. 349, 354-355), at least until the 
explanatory-conceptual value of BSM started to be vindicated in the 90s.
As far as predictions are concerned, there is a consensus within the philosophical litera-
ture about SM (Wallace, 2020) about the enormous effectiveness of Gibbsian formalism in 
calculating future values of macrovariables of systems with thermal behavior. In this sense, 
I must now point out that another of the fundamental epistemic virtues of statistical me-
chanics is not the possibility of developing powerful predictions but its capacity to generate 
properly effective pragmatic predictions. Namely, that those predictions can be carried out 
by means of techniques and resources realistically accessible to the majority of competent 
physicists. Note that this is not merely a pragmatic virtue, but also an epistemic one, since 
the possibility of carrying out statistical-mechanical predictions with technical ease deter-
mines the knowledge about the phenomena terms that we can acquire through SM. From 
this, a second criterion can be defined, stablishing the minimum necessary conditions for a 
prediction to be an effective one:
Predictive Effectiveness Criterion:
A description of the future macrovariables fi of a system with thermal behavior θ constitutes 
an effective prediction if (i) the computation of such values can be computationally treatable, and 
in that case (ii) if such description specifies a well-defined algorithmic procedure that allows cal-
culating such values by means of realistic computational resources with respect to actual practices.
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Again, this criterion proposes a necessary-minimalist condition (again, it could be comple-
mented by further conditions) for a statistical mechanical prediction to be effective: sim-
ply, that it can be carried out by means of realistic computational resources-procedures, and 
if this is the case, that such computational procedures are specified through a well-defined 
algorithm. I must make it clear that the lack of predictive effectiveness of a theoretical de-
vice does not mean that it does not have multiple (and even solid) practical applications in 
various fields. For example, the fact that BSM can develop predictions about how a liquid 
crystal will evolve in contact with a heat bath does not mean that this prediction is ‘effec-
tive’ in the sense specified above.
For the Boltzmannian program, to be able to predict the macroscopic values that the 
system will take in future moments of the dynamic evolution it will be prima facie neces-
sary, in the first place, to determine the number of microstates contained within the mac-
rostate Γm wherein the actual microstate x of the system would be located at the beginning 
of its dynamic evolution. As I claimed in Section 2, this is not only a computationally ex-
haustive task (approximately 1023 position-velocity values per individual microstate), but 
also computationally intractable since the number of microstates μ(Γm) to be determined 
is continuously infinite, see Figure 1. Even if we ideally can solve this problem (for example, 
by means of discretization techniques or an ad hoc coarse-graining), we must also solve the 
mechanical analytical equations of motion associated with each microstate represented by 
phase trajectories. However, as Shenker points out: “This is an idealization, and such cal-
culation is doubly impossible: the system is too complex, and the number of microstates, 
and hence of trajectory segments, is a continuous infinity” (Shenker 2020, p. 11). Note that 
even the definition of the probability that a microstate will be in a particular macrostate at 
a particular time16 depends also on carrying out these computationally impossible calcula-
tions.
Although explanatorily powerful and conceptual consistent, most of Boltzmannian pre-
dictions of physically significant systems (a number of components of n ≈ 1023) do not meet 
the above effectiveness criterion based on mathematical tractability and pragmatic feasibil-
ity. Additionally, BSM does not specify any ‘canonical’ or ‘standard’ algorithmic procedure 
to perform predictive calculations in a pragmatically realistic manner with respect to those 
available to scientific agents in actual statistical mechanical contexts. I could argue at this 
point that the main reason underlying BSM’s inability to predict is precisely its epistemic de-
pendence (descriptive, explanatory and predictive) on individual mi crostates as fundamental 
representational structures; however, as McCoy points out: “Individual microstates, in con-
trast to macrostates, are essentially irrelevant to making predictions in the theory” (McCoy, 
2020). In order not to convey the wrong impression to the reader, I will stress once again 
that, despite not being a predictively effective theory according to this criterion, BSM has an 
extremely extensive domain of predictive applicability ranging from ideal gases to Kerr black 
holes. But the central issue here is that those predictions are both calculationally difficult to 
perform and extremely computationally expensive.
On the other hand, it could be argued that in the context of GSM, descriptions of fu-
ture macrovariables of the system would generally be assumed as effective SM-predictions 
16 This probability value is defined in terms of the proportion of microstate from the initial macrostate 
that are in the region associated with the latter macrostate.
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because of the role of statistical techniques like coarse-graining and phase averaging. In this 
sense, Malament and Zabell claimed that “As a black box technique, Gibbs phase averag-
ing works just fine. The question is why it works” (Malament and Zabell, 1980, p. 340). 
First, many Gibbsian-ensemblist authors like Wallace (2020) justify the introduction of 
probabilistic techniques like phase averaging and coarse graining based on the avoidance 
of computationally expensive microstatistical calculations typical of Boltzmannian predic-
tions. This grounds precisely what Wallace (2020) calls the (we would add ‘pragmatic’) ne-
cessity of GSM. Other authors such as Malament and Zabell (1980) justify these Gibbsian 
procedures on the assumption that the target system is ergodic. Disregarding how these 
techniques can be justified, they play a pragmatically indispensable role in SM-practices: 
“[probabilistic techniques] are shortcuts that enable practical predictions, which are actu-
ally carried out in statistical mechanics” (Shenker, 2020, p. 11).
Secondly, such Gibbsian predictions are not only realistically treatable, but also specify 
an algorithmic procedure to practically predict, for example, what certain observable val-
ues of a gas will be when it has already expanded throughout the volume of the vessel from 
the values measured at the beginning of the evolution: e.g. (1) represents the initial observ-
able values of the gas by means of a (usually canonical) ρ-encoded ensemble, (2) allows the 
probability distribution ρ to transit phase space Γ, (3) performs a phase average over ρ with 
respect to the cells of the coarse-grained phase space, deriving a new probability distribu-
tion ρ*, (4) uses this new distribution ρ* to calculate the future values of the observables 
of the gas. Therefore, the inability of Gibbsian formalism to specify the microstatistical dy-
namic properties (recall Section 5) is compensated by its ability to generate practically ad-
vantageous computational procedures.
Therefore, the predictive potential of the Gibbsian apparatus is based on the exploita-
tion of practical statistical techniques, mainly in calculating observable values of physical 
systems. It allows GSM to generate significatively effective predictions of thermal behavior 
such as the expansion of a gas in a vessel, specifying by means of practical algorithms how 
this should be realistically carried out. Thus, GSM stands as a physical theory capable of 
generating effective statistical mechanical predictions of certain thermal behaviors.
7. Epistemic Schism and Hempel’s Symmetry Thesis
To sum up, I have just evaluated in the last two sections in what sense the distinction be-
tween BSM and GSM as two fundamentally different statistical mechanical formalisms 
should be understood not only as a fundamental theory and an effective theory, respec-
tively (Lazarovici, 2019; Frigg & Werndl, 2019), but properly as an epistemic schism 
within SM. Thus, each of these theoretical proposals would fulfill only one of the two main 
key epistemic functions in the statistical mechanical context, either to powerfully explain 
(BSM) or to effectively predict (GSM) thermal behavior, but not the other function.
7.1. Statistical Mechanics against Hempel’s Symmetry Thesis
Interestingly, this epistemic schism between the main approaches to statistical mechan-
ics that I have defended throughout this paper constitutes a clear counterexample to what 
https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.22134 415
The epistemic schism of statistical mechanics
is known in the literature as the ‘symmetry thesis’ (Douglas, 2009; Fetzer, 2017), which 
would affirm in broad terms (i) that every satisfactory explanation also has predictive po-
tential regarding the phenomenon explained and (ii) that every satisfactory prediction will 
have explanatory potential with respect to the predicted values. This was originally de-
fended by Carl Hempel (1958) in his famous text “The theoretician’s dilemma”, wherein 
“Hempel was not only defending the position that every adequate scientific explanation is 
potentially predictive but also the position that every adequate scientific prediction is po-
tentially explanatory” (Fetzer, 2017, Section 5.1). However, such symmetry between expla-
nations and predictions (and even retrodictions, namely, inferring past values) is based, in 
Hempelian terms, on the fact that both share the same logical form. According to this au-
thor, the proper difference between the two lies in the fact that “[an explanation] will qual-
ify as a prediction only if [its explanandum] refers to an occurrence at a time later than that 
at which the argument is offered” (Hempel 1958, p. 38).
However, as I have shown in detail in the previous sections, a description D1 underly-
ing a powerful statistically mechanical explanations17 such as Boltzmann’s (1896) or cer-
tain typicality-based Neo-Boltzmannian’s (see Lazarovici and Reichert, 2015) of the ther-
mal behavior of a gas expanding freely in a vessel won’t constitute an effective prediction 
of the future observable thermodynamic values f i that the gas will take, precisely because 
the extreme difficulty (if not pragmatic impossibility) of calculating such values from the 
intractable microstatistical evolution of the system. In the same vein, another descrip-
tion D1 underlying an effective SM prediction of these same values that the gas at its ther-
mal equilibrium must necessarily obviate, by means of pragmatic statistical calculation 
procedures, the enormous amount of microdynamic data required to explain the process 
of balancing from the molecular components of the gas. It should be noticed that when 
Hempel (1956) speaks of ‘prediction’, he does not explicitly consider the relevance of the 
pragmatic factors underlying the possible predictions. However, being charitable with the 
applicability of this Hempelian logical-empiricist position, I should assume that it some-
how intended to clarify real scientific practices. In this case, the contingent calculative 
limitations underlying BSM’s predictive ability should also be included in any philosoph-
ical assessment (and that includes Hempelian evaluations) of the epistemic dimension of 
these theories.
In conclusion, one face a fundamental dilemma regarding the epistemic functions of 
SM: either the statistical mechanical apparatus is conceptually consistent enough to gen-
erate descriptions that powerfully explain thermal phenomena from the microstatisti-
cal dynamics of their constituents (BSM-horn), or the statistical mechanical apparatus is 
pragmatic enough to generate descriptions that efficiently predict thermodynamic values 
(GSM-horn). When a SM-description like D1 satisfactorily meets the necessary condition 
of the minimalist criterion to constitute a powerful explanation (i.e. specify both the initial 
macro-condition and the microstatistical dynamic property from which the thermal behav-
ior is derived), then this SM-description D1 won’t be able to satisfactorily meet the neces-
17 Of course, when Hempel (1958) originally developed the symmetry thesis, the type of explanation he 
used to define that thesis was those based on the famous deductive-nomological model. In any case, I 
will assume here that the content of such a thesis is generalizable to any model of statistical mechanical 
explanation.
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sary condition of the minimalist criterion to constitute an effective prediction (i.e. compu-
tational tractability and algorithmically specify practical procedures to calculate observable 
values), and the other way around. That is, according to my analysis developed so far, any 
SM-description can satisfy either the ‘explanatory powerfulness criterion’ or the ‘predictive 
effectiveness criterion’, but in no case both simultaneously. Therefore, at least in the case of 
statistical mechanics, the explanatory potential of a theory or a description of that theory 
does not correlate directly with the predictive potential (in terms of practical effectiveness) 
of that same theory, against Hempel’s (1958) symmetry thesis.
7.2.  Conceptual Architecture and the Foundations of Statistical 
Mechanics
Although I argued that the epistemic schism of SM would be a straightforward contra-
diction of Hempel’s symmetry thesis, I also claim the Hempelian idea by which explana-
tions and predictions of a theory share the form of their logical structure. An assessment 
of the common structure between the explicability and predictability of theories would 
allow us, as pointed out by authors such as Douglas (2009), to understand satisfactorily 
the explanatory value that resides in the predictions, as well as the predictive value that 
we can find in the explanations. Concerning our aim here, is precisely this that would 
explain the fundamental (although historically contingent) epistemic split of this very 
physical discipline. I suggest that what Hempel called ‘logical structure’ in his 1958 pa-
per could be properly understood in more philosophically fruitful terms (and detached 
from the assumptions of this author’s received view) as the ‘conceptual architecture’ un-
derlying the explanatory potential or the predictive capacity of BSM and GSM, respec-
tively.
Regarding the conceptual architecture of the theoretical Boltzmann apparatus, its ex-
planatory power and predictive inefficiency would be satisfactorily explained by two ele-
ments: (a1) its capacity to descriptively exploit individual microstates xi of the system (see 
Figure 1, left), which directly appeals to the behavior of the system’s components, but does 
not contribute to the prediction of macroscopic values f i (see McCoy, 2020); and (b1) the 
coarse-grained partitioning of Γ into macrostates Γm whose direct function is not to easily 
compute but to microstatistically represent thermodynamic values (Section 2.2). On the 
other hand, the explanatory deficiency and predictive efficiency of the Gibbsian appara-
tus would depend intrinsically on certain elements underlying its theoretical architecture: 
(a2) its capacity to exploit the observable macrovariables ensemble-encoded, predictively 
efficient but useless to microscopically explain thermal phenomena; and (b1) the coarse-
grained of Γ in equal cells ωi (see Figure 2, right) that allow not to represent faithfully but 
to compute enormous amounts of microstatistical information by means of phase averag-
ing (Section 2.2.). I defend that it is precisely these elements (a1-b2) of the SM concep-
tual architecture on which the explanatory power (a1 and b1) and the predictive efficiency 
(a2 and b2) of this discipline are based (see Table 1 below). Consequently, it is precisely 
the fact that (a1) is theoretically incompatible with (a2) and that (b1) is theoretically in-
compatible with (b2) that would ultimately explain the epistemic split between BSM and 
GSM.
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Table 1. Conceptual Architecture of BSM and GSM underlying the Epistemic Schism of SM
BSM GSM
Descriptive element Individual microstates x Probability density ρ
Partition of Γ Macrostates Γm Cells ωi







However, my defense of the epistemic schism of SM should not be taken as a negative the-
sis about the foundations of this discipline, but as a recognition of the development during 
more than one hundred and twenty years of two SM-theories centered on two clearly dif-
ferentiated epistemic functions: that of powerfully explaining thermal phenomena from 
their micro-components and that of effectively predicting from a huge amount of microsta-
tistical values. For instance, Boltzmann entropy should not be foundationally conceived as 
being merely theoretically (or ‘numerically’) different or equivalent to Gibbs entropy, but 
properly from the capacity of the former to explain microstatistically the notion of thermo-
dynamic entropy (Callender, 1999) against the practical effectiveness of the latter to calcu-
late future values: “Physicists tend to be busy people; they want and need to obtain prac-
tical results about experiments and observable phenomena, and in order to do so they use 
the best tools at their disposal. For statistical mechanics, the tools are ensemblist tools, pio-
neered by Gibbs” (Goldstein, 2019, p. 456).
Although both theories have historically evolved along parallel paths, they are not at 
odds with each other, as Wallace (2020) argues. The thesis that I have defended in this pa-
per can contribute to understanding how the explanatory powerful conceptual architecture 
(i.e. Hempel’s logical structure) of BSM can be fundamental in accounting for the lack of 
explanatory power of GSM, just as the predictively effective technical apparatus of GSM 
can illuminate the practical difficulties that BSM entails. Therefore, if we consider statis-
tical mechanics itself as the rich theoretical-conceptual space based on the Boltzmannian 
and Gibbsian proposals, then this discipline will be globally as explanatory powerful as the 
first one and as predictively effective as the second one: “the point of [SM] is (...) an effec-
tive framework for the description of complex systems that requires some degree of prag-
matism and good physical sense” (Lazarovici, 2019, p. 793). This leads us to think that only 
by delving into the space opened by the schism between these two great statistical mechani-
cal programs can we continue to progress (as we have been doing during the last decades) in 
the rich foundations that underlie this fruitful physical theory.
8. Conclusion
In this paper I have argued that statistical mechanics cannot be understood univocally as 
a single theory, but as two fundamentally different theoretical devices, BSM and GSM, 
based on different conceptual resources and technical-formal procedures. Particularly, my 
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main objective has been to argue that the fundamental difference between these two statis-
tical mechanical formalisms must be properly expressed in terms of the epistemic capabili-
ties of both. While Boltzmann’s proposal has the ability to generate powerful explanations 
of thermal phenomena from the dynamics of their components, Gibbs’ proposal has the 
ability to predict in a highly effective way the values of the observables of thermal systems. 
That is, either one can powerfully explain from BSM why a gas approaches equilibrium 
when it expands freely in a vessel by appealing to the dynamics of its microscopic compo-
nents, or one can computationally-efficiently predict from GSM the macroscopic proper-
ties that the gas will adopt as soon as it occupies the entire volume of the vessel. Therefore, 
contrary to Hempel’s symmetry thesis, the epistemic ability of a theoretical device such as 
BSM or GSM to powerfully explain does not correlate (at least directly) with the epistemic 
ability of this same theoretical device to effectively predict.
By assuming such a split of the main epistemic functions (mainly, explaining and pre-
dicting) of the statistical mechanics between BSM and GSM as a constitutive part of this 
physical theory, we can come to understand in depth why the latter formalism is hegem-
onic within real predictive practices (Wallace, 2020) and the former is constantly claimed 
in philosophical domains (e.g. Callender, 1999; Albert, 2000) for its conceptual coherence 
in providing explanations of thermal phenomena, shedding light on such central foun-
dational questions as “how can one use one formalism to explain the nonequilibrium be-
haviour of physical systems and to give a foundational account of SM, while continuing to 
use the other formalism for everyday equilibrium calculation?” (Frigg and Werndl, 2019, 
p. 425). In conclusion, my proposal to deepen the explanatory-predictive split of statisti-
cal mechanics is properly an opportunity to understand that the deep epistemic richness 
of this physical discipline lies precisely in a desirable close collaboration between the Boltz-
mannian and the Gibbsian program.
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